WellBeing International

WBI Studies Repository
1984

The Question of Animal Awareness
Francoise Wemelsfelder
Instituut voor Theoretische Biologie

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.wellbeingintlstudiesrepository.org/acwp_asie
Part of the Animal Studies Commons, Comparative Psychology Commons, and the Other Animal
Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Wemelsfelder, F. (1984). The question of animal awareness. In M.W. Fox & L.D. Mickley (Eds.), Advances
in animal welfare science 1984/85 (pp. 1-18). Washington, DC: The Humane Society of the United States.

This material is brought to you for free and open access
by WellBeing International. It has been accepted for
inclusion by an authorized administrator of the WBI
Studies Repository. For more information, please contact
wbisr-info@wellbeingintl.org.

THE QUESTION OF ANIMAL AWARENESS
Francoise Wemelsfelder
lnstituut voor Theoretische Biologie
Groenhovenstraat 5, 2311 BT Leiden
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INTRODUCTION
The problem of animal awareness lies at the interface of science
and philosophy. As a starting point for the study of phenomena such
as awareness, mind, consciousness, etc., we hardly have any reference
other than our own human experience and in the context of a nondualistic ontology this can be justified. In philosophy and psychology
it appears to be very difficult to give direct operational definitions of
terms such as consciousness, etc. So we might expect this to be even
more difficult in the study of animals. A detailed knowledge of animals
and their behaviour is necessary in order to be able to say something
about their subjective experiences, and to prevent us from excessively
projecting human experience on animals.
Descriptive terms dealing with the nature of animal awareness,
like intelligence, consciousness, etc., are normative as well (Hodos
1982), and therefore the study of animal awareness has wide-ranging
moral implications for our own conduct towards animals (Griffin
1981a; Midgley 1981); some of the reluctance in recognizing the question of animal awareness as legitimate and "scientific" might be explained this way. The question of animal awareness implies the question of the human-animal relationship.

DEFINITIONS
Terms such as awareness, self-awareness, self-consciousness,
etc., indicate that there is a gradual scale of awareness rather than
distinct "states" of awareness. Each species, and each individual
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animal within a species, can display different elements of awareness at
different times. Roughly s~eaking, though, the development from
lower to higher animals will coincide with an increasing degree of
awareness. And, as higher degrees of (self-) awareness are achieved,
the more basic forms remain present and functional; they are recapitulated in the development of young individual mammals.
First of all, there is the level of the "un-conscious" or pre-conscious for bodily, e.g. physiological processes, or the maintenance of
homeostasis in general. This level is present in all living beings. In conscious life, as opposed to unconscious life, the most basic property
seems to be awareness: "a feeling of causal relationship with the external world" (Whitehead, cited by Griffin 1977). This feeling, according
to Whitehead, implies discrimination of the quality of the environment
(harmful or beneficial) and a sense of location. Down to the lowest
forms of life, there are signs of this sort of awareness, be it ever so
vague and unspecified. Directly linked to this is the concept of selfhood: "all animals have attained self-hood, since they exist, have a
will to survive, and have also needs and interests" (Fox 1983a).
Accepting the idea that perception is basically an "emotional"
phenomenon, a "feeling," as Whitehead argues, awareness as defined
above is not necessarily equivalent to mental capacity. Awareness
might be accompanied with the experience of some form of mental images; but by mental capacity is meant the ability to abstract information from external reality in such a way that the dependence of the individual on the environment decreases. "Mind" in this context is more
than just the presence of mental images (Gallup 1982, personal communication); it is the capacity to "use" these images in a flexible, adaptive way (Griffin 1981b).
Hodos (1982), in a recent review of the concept of intelligence,
defines intelligence as a qualitative characterization of an organism's
behavioural responses to pressures from the environment, rather than
as a "specific intellectual faculty." Being intelligent implies the ability
to fulfill purposes, but Hodos' definition stresses the fact that, e.g., a
rabbit's purpose might be very different from human purposes.
Along with a growing ability to abstract information about external reality and manipulate the environment instead of being manipulated, a sense of individuality develops as well. Thorpe (1966) refers to
self-awareness as individual recognition, of self and others, as a
"self." Self-awareness, more than awareness, is the "understanding
that I can be the object of another's attentions" (Clark 1981), the ability to see the "self" as another "other" in the environment. While the
world in a primary state of self-hood is predominantly subjective,
without discrimination between self and other (Fox 1982), the presence
of self-awareness in an animal implies its ability to have a relationship
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with its own body and with its environment, culminating in the experience of an "I" that is not identical with its body nor with its environment. "Self-awareness is the animal's ability to abstract and to form a
conceptual framework of its environment, so that it can perceive itself
and its actions in relation to the environment" (Wood-Gush 1981).
Self-awareness can become more explicit, and result in still a
greater freedom from the environment when self-conscious elements
increase; implying the ability to focus attention (Griffin 1981a) or the
ability to manipulate ideas (Thorpe 1966). Self-consciousness implies
the existence of some sort of introspective ability, the direct experience of the self as self, as a causal agent, not being dominated by sensory brain processes (Thorpe 1966; Sperry 1982). Maybe a clue is that
the word "con-scious" comes from the latin verb scire meaning
"knowing." So "conscious" means "also-knowing": an act performed
by a more or less self-conscious being is accompanied by a knowledge
of the relativity of the act: its reasons, its purpose, etc. This might be
most clearly manifested in the ability to make plans, to act purposefully, or the presence of time-awareness. When consciousness of self increases, then also do the scope of "understanding" and the degree of
freedom increase: self-reflectiveness implies the ability to recognize individuality in others due to the fact that other and self are of the same
kind (Clark 1981). Moreover it becomes possible to manipulate others
(Fox 1982). Capacities like empathy, altruism, intentional deceit, gratitude, etc., are signs of these abilities.
In sum, I propose that any living being has awareness; but an increasing amount of self-awareness entails a splitting of self and other,
an ability to discriminate self from not-self, which may be interpreted
as the ability to "objectify" (Fox 1982).
In the context of this paragraph it is also important to note that
the capacity to suffer could in principle be present well down to the
"lower" levels, since awareness is defined as an emotional perception
of the quality of the environment to suffering of self-aware beings; yet
it indicates that suffering is present not only in self-aware beings.

THE MIND-BODY RELATIONSHIP
The phenomenon of "consciousness," and the existence of an objective "I" has always fascinated man (Lorenz 1963). Is it something
that just human beings have, or is the existence of "personality" a
universal phenomenon, somehow present in the whole of nature? Different theories have been given to explain the nature of the relationship between "mind" and "body"; within philosophy, it has always
been a major topic for study, since it comes so close to the mystery of
existence of life itself.
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The discussion seems to evolve around two basic perspectives: a
dualistic one, in which mind is a separate entity from matter in principle; or a panpsychistic one, which assumes "some sort of psychic element in the ultimate physical particles" (Thorpe 1977).
The dualistic perspective has become very influential since Descartes. In this view, one may regard the mind-body relationship as a
two-way causal interaction between mental and physical events
(Thorpe 1977). Another form of dualism is the so-called psycho-physical-parellelism theory, in which mental events may be seen as a "sideeffect" of physical events (Lorenz 1963).
Since dualism is in essence reductionistic (Thorpe 1977), the question comes up at what point in evolution "mind" came into being and
what its adaptive value is in the mechanism of natural selection.
Thorpe (1966) stated that "consciousness may have been an evolutionary necessity in that it may have been the only way in which
highly complex living organisms could become fully viable." In this
way, it would be of great interest to see "whether we can find grounds
to think that consciousness is present only above a certain level of
neural organization." Thorpe thus seems to follow the widespread intuitive assumption that consciousness is related to complexity of neural organization; and also that it is generated "out of the blue" at a certain point in evolution, through the process of natural selection. Griffin (1981a) also mentions the adaptive value of consciousness for complex animals, in order to cope with changing situations. He goes on,
however, arguing that "a sufficiently fertile imagination can almost
always find a plausible adaptive advantage for any observed trait,"
and therefore the argument for the adaptive value of consciousness is
not very weighty in the consideration of its existence. Humphrey
(1982) expresses his doubt of complexity as a condition for consciousness by saying that our animal ancestors "were no doubt percipient,
intelligent, complexily motivated creatures, whose internal control
mechanisms were in many respects the equals of our own. But it is to
say that they had no way of looking in upon the mechanism. They had
clever brains, but blank minds." He proposes social complexity as a
reason for the sudden appearance of consciousness.
Arguments against dualistic perspectives are that one can
speculate about possible parameters for the generation of consciousness, but these remain scientifically unverifiable, and ultimately
the existence of life itself becomes an unexplainable event in a dualistic
framework.
"Generally, in the building of a scientifically 'sound' theory, we
want the newly apparent property to be explicable in terms of the
old, ... to be the sum of whatever composes it... So the awareness of a
complex organism ought, we feel, to be a similar resultant, and either
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atoms are already conscious, or else consciousness is only a misleading
label for neural impulse" (Nagel, cited by Clarke 1981). "There must be
something positive limiting chance, and something more than mere
matter in matter, or Darwinism fails to explain life" (Hartshorne, cited
by Birch 1974). Others, however, reject the idea of "panpsychism" as
"cheap" and "a radical simplification" (Popper 1974), or because it is
not possible to confirm this idea scientifically, and that there is no visible evidence that lower life forms are conscious, as are humans and
some higher animals (Thorpe 1977).
There is, however, a third perspective possible. It is a concept in
some ways resembling panpsychism, yet it is also fundamentally different. Whitehead has developed a theory in which events are at the
same time both mental and physical. Thorpe (1977) states that Whitehead is a panpsychist, yet this does not seem the case to me. The idea
that all "life-events" are physical and mental by nature, does not imply that these events are conscious of this, as panpsychism implies. Nor
does the idea that perception and physical energy are emotional in
nature, imply that this emotionality is consciously experienced at the
lower levels.
A theory which defined the nature of life processes as both physical and mental, in a meaningful interaction, provides a basis for a
gradually evolving continuum of mental capacity. The fact that we accept the statement "human beings are conscious" more or less as an
axiom (Lorenz 1980), forces us to accept that we most probably share
this quality at least rudimentarily with most life forms (Fox 1976;
Griffin 1981a; Rollin 1981; Lorenz 1980).
To account for the evolution of a rudimentary form of perception
of causal relationships, to a conscious experience of self is not easy,
and still requires the explanation of "leaps," for example between the
occurence of mental images and the use of a real mind, as defined
above.
The results of the research on split brains and the nature of consciousness by Nobel-prize winner Roger Sperry (1982) point in the direction of an explanatory concept known as "the emergent principle."
It implies that interaction between parts creates a "whole" that has intrinsic qualities of its own which none of the parts possess. In
Whitehead's framework, this element of "the whole being more than
the sum of the parts" is equivalent to the subjective, "mental" part of
events. "The key development is a switch ... to a new causal or interactionist interpretation that ascribes to the inner experience an integral
causal control role in brain function and behaviour ... The whole,
besides being 'different from, and greater than the sum of the parts,' ...
also causally determines the fates of the parts, without interfering
with the physical or chemical laws of subentities at their own level.
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The events of inner experience as emergent properties of brain processes, become themselves explanatory causal constructs in their own
right." (Sperry 1982).
These results are derived from research on human beings, and
therefore mainly apply to them. A much wider range of application of
the main principles is clearly indicated, however; Sperry himself states
that the acceptance of the revised causal view has important implications for scientific views of man and nature. Also he says that his results indicate features about the nature of consciousness and its fundamental relation to "brain processing." Unless we suppose that the
general concept of animal consciousness is completely different from
human consciousness, which is extremely unlikely (Fox 1976; Midgley
1978; Griffin 1981a), it is only reasonable to apply general principles
about "the nature of consciousness" to animals as well, and in a
Whiteheadian framework to all evolutionary events in general.
If this is the case, then however simple the nervous mechanism
might be, there will always be generated ''a whole,'' some sort of inner
experience.
Complexity of nervous structure probably correlates to complexity of inner experience (Fox 1976). The more complex the interaction
between parts, which then in turn can serve as a new part, of a new
emergent quality, a new ''whole.'' But it would be a mistake to set up a
simple hierarchy of values, attributed to different sorts of complexity
(Hodos 1982). Rather, all life forms constitute "an integrated, interdependent unified field of being, not a ladder leading to some
ultimate goal of perfection." (Fox personal communication 1982).
What an emergent "whole" seems to express is "the being-ness"
of a certain animal, e.g., "the dogness" that comes out of the specific
neural organization of a dog. This beingness implies consciousness on
its own level, on its dog-, or fish-, or whale-level. Each "beingness"
has its own, unique qualities to contribute to the overall ecosystem
and possesses unique modes of perception and awareness, suitable for
the needs of the animal (Hodos 1982).
In conclusion, we can say that man is not alone on earth in his
awareness of life around him; all life forms are conscious in their own,
unique way, and the capacity to individualize and become self-aware
gradually emerges from the lowest levels of perception.
Philosophically speaking, the possibility for real sensitivity and
awareness in the animal kingdom is given. Now we must see what the
biological study of awareness leads to in the framework of a nondualistic philosophy.
In the biological study of awareness, the main indicator for "beingness" would be behaviour, since it represents that aspect of an
animal in which all partial aspects, like physiological and hormonal
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processes, are integrated; it also includes the subjective, individual
evaluation of all these partial aspects. Behaviour, being itself an
emergent property, is the nearest indicator of the animal's emergent
individual subjectivity and quality of being. In fact, one could say that
behaviour is the overt, outward manifestation of inner experience,
both being on the same level of emergence.
An animal relates to its environment through its behaviour. It expresses its inner drives, abilities, and experiences in the way it deals
with different environmental influences. We, as "human animals," can
evaluate different kinds of behaviour by observation and experiments,
and try to classify the quality of beingness as "aware," "self-aware,"
"intelligent," etc. The behavioural data available for this will now be
discussed.

THE ANIMAL AND ITS ENVIRONMENT
The great "oneness" between animal and environment, the complete adaptation which makes animals fit right into their specific
''niche,'' has caused some scientists to presume that animals are
automata, blindly ruled by environmental circumstances. The other,
opposite, way of looking at it is that animals are so perfectly aware of
their environment and at one with it, that an almost transcendent unity arises. In this view the essence of animal life lies largely in its relation to the surrounding world, and this notion leads "phenomenological" scientists to say that the subjectivity of an animal lies as it were
in its "Umwelt" and a qualitative study of the way ananimal "meets"
its environment is the basis for understanding the animal's experiential world, as well as its ecological function (Kortlandt 1954).
This qualitative beingness of an animal is called its nature, or
"telos" (Midgley 1978; Rollin 1981), implying the unique expression of
life that a species represents, and the specificity of needs and purposes
of each different species.
D.R. Griffin should receive the credit for having opened the door
again to serious scientific investigation into animal awareness with his
book The Question of Animal Awareness (1981a). With respect to
animal learning, one of the most basic properties of animal life, he suggests that the principle of parsimony might be best served by accepting some sort of awareness related to animal learning. Trying to stick
to the behaviourist standpoint that animals are black boxes leads to
''complex circumlocutions and confusing euphemisms,'' which are ''far
less parsimonious than frankly calling a spade a spade and a thought a
thought.''
The ability to learn is one of the most basic properties of animal
life. In his review on animal intelligence, Hodos (1982) states that habi-
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tuation "appears to be a universal phenomenon in animal organisms,
including protozoans." Also "classical-and operant conditioning have
been demonstrated ... in those metazoans that possess a central nervous system with axial symmetry." This includes platyhelminthes
(e.g., planarians), annelids, arthropods and molluscs. Delayed response
as a more complex behaviour has been reported in arthropods and molluscs, and molluscs are also capable of reversal learning, so Hodos reports.
A well-known anecdote that Buytendijk reports is that an octopus
is able to distinguish between "touching" and "being touched," which
might even indicate the presence of self-awareness: "A good example
of a lower animal with highly developed interactions with its environment is the octopus, which has a highly differentiated set of behaviour,
much more so than some vertebrates ... One could attribute a relatively
clear form of consciousness to an octopus ... The fact that an octopus
has so-called pupil-reactions e.g. in adverse situations, an indication
of emotional life in mammals, could imply a high degree of development" (Buytendijk 1963).
Entomologist V.B. Wiggelsworth in a recent article argued that
insects might experience visceral pain, as well as pain caused by heat
and electric shock (Rollin 1981). From the existing literature it can be
argued that the experience of pain as such is not possible without the
presence of some sort of purely subjective, inner experience, since the
adversity of any stimulus is essentially something which is experienced
subjectively.
Given the fact that awareness seems to exist from the "lowest"
level of animal life onward, it develops and becomes more complex
along with the development of neural complexity, as was stated earlier. But do animals come near to any kind of "higher" awareness at
all, any kind of the faculties we consider "intelligent" and self-aware
in humans? More than anything else, introspection and the use of symbols are regarded as specific human characteristics, which set man
apart from all other living beings (Jeuken 1975).

GENERAL INTELLIGENT BEHAVIOUR
The ability to make use of symbols is related to a number of other
abilities: to use language, to use concepts, to have time-awareness,
and to respond adequately to novelty, amongst others. It implies a
capacity to abstract from present reality, and in that respect is directly linked to introspection, which is the capacity to regard the self in an
abstract, "symbolic" way. Many authors connect introspection with
social communication (Humphrey 1978; Midgley 1978; Griffin 1981a;
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Thorpe 1966), or with intention-behaviour and imitation (Rollin 1981;
Midgley 1978). These are mostly the topics dealt with by authors who
discuss animal awareness. They support their point of view with evidence coming from either the little amount of systematic research being done in this field, or from anecdotes of "natural," "spontaneous"
behaviour. A few relevant examples of this evidence will be given
shortly.
Griffin (1981a) states that "Black, McMullan, Robinson, and
others have distinguished animal communication systems from human language on the ground that the former are rigid responses to external or internal stimuli, which ... be definitely specified, whereas
human language is spontaneous, creative and unpredictable." The animal's ability to communicate may be less rigid, however, since studies
of animal behaviour have shown that animals are also capable of spontaneous, creative and unpredictable behaviour. For example, Markowitz (1982), in his book on behavioural enrichment in zoos, reports the
highly unique, creative, unpredictable way in which zoo animals would
invent solutions and play games. A young elephant, for instance, instead of touching the right panel to set off an electrically regulated
reward, would always save water in his trunk, no matter how long before the experimental session the trough was emptied, and smear the
water between the response panels, thereby electrically shorting them,
·so that every response would pay off. (The same elephant walked over
to the only arrogant, boasting person in a group of students and stepped deliberately on this person's foot). This story, in which the animal
actually manipulates the research project and the researcher, instead
of the other way around, can hardly be interpreted otherwise than as a
falsification of the argument presented by the three researchers in
Griffin's book. It gives evidence of the presence of time-awareness ("I
will use this water later"), intentionality, conceptual thinking and
creativity in handling a completely new situation, and its behaviour
therefore is worthy to be labelled consciously self-aware.
All of this also holds for a story that Rollin (1981) reports of a
police dog who was trained to hold suspects by the arm unharmed until the officer arrived. When they ran into a robbery being performed
by two men, the men broke away and took off in different directions,
assuming the dog could not pursue both. The dog chased one of them,
disabled his leg, left him, ran after the other and held this man
unharmed by his arm, in this way having caught both men, although
he never had been trained to attack the leg. Like Fox (1982), Mugford
(1981) concludes that the ability to manipulate matters in order to
fulfill a need, gives evidence of self-awareness. Many dog owners may
be able to give examples of dogs who manipulate their owners. Dolphins, apes (Midgley 1978), wolves (Fox 1974), etc., are able to save
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wounded fellows and humans, use and invent tools, and deceive prey in
order to catch it. Both Markowitz and Mugford stress the fact that in
these situations the animal is in control, rather than the experimenter,
and that by humbling himself in this way, the observer might "investigate ways in which animals derive unique solutions, rather than
simply measuring their activities in a narrow response largely dictated
by the experimenter." (Markowitz 1982). However, there are also experiments that indicate some sort of awareness in different animals.
Dawkins (1980) describes well-known experiments with pigeons and
rats. Beninger and his co-workers trained rats to indicate what
behaviour they were performing at the moment a buzzer was sounding. They tried to find a simpler hypothesis than that the rats were actually aware of what they were doing, but failed to do so. This experiment strongly suggests even a kind of conscious awareness in rats.
Hernstein and Loveland, and Siegel and Honig, proved by showing
numerous slides to pigeons that they are capable of forming what
could be described as abstract concepts of almost anything, like water,
trees, human beings, etc.; Kohler furthermore found by doing ingenious, well-controlled tests that pigeons can count, or as he put it,
"think unnamed numbers," and in doing this, really grasp the concept
of numbers, rather than being "Clever Hanses." (Clever Hans was a
horse who could do many a mathematical calculation, but later it was
discovered that he reacted to subtle indications of his owner, instead of
calculating.)
It seems that this evidence, experimental and anecdotal, shows
that some animals are fully capable of abstraction and that they can
think symbolically in order to express themselves and control their
world. What about the "highest" form of symbolic communication,
namely language?

LANGUAGE
There is no consensus about the real nature of language, let alone
the difference between man and animals in this respect. Chomsky
(cited by Griffin 1981a), argues that "the unboundness of human
speech, as an expression of limitless thought, is an entirely different
matter (from animal communication), because of the freedom from
stimulus control and the appropriateness to new situations." Griffin
comments that animal communication is not that rigid at all, nor is
human language endless in its scope. Midgley (1978) considers speech
as a further development of "creative, expressive, communicative
power," and nothing all by itself. Fox (1976) relates speech to the controlling and predicting function of the rational mind, which does not
diminish the consciousness and deep emotional experiences that the in-
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tuitive mind can have, without speaking a word. Animals can very well
have such an intuitive kind of mentality. In this line, Rollin (1981)
argues, while discussing the "private language argument" developed
by Wittgenstein, that animals might have to rely far more on direct experience for learning than on words, or that they might express their
universal statements (all strangers are dangerous) by their behaviour
instead of words, but that this does not imply that animals are not rational beings; rational being defined as the ability to do the right thing
at a certain moment, choosing between different possibilities (Rollin
1981; Midgley 1978). In any case, the fact that the possession of a communication system is a widespread property rather than a specific
human trait, might be demonstrated by the ability of the chimpanzees
trained by the Gardners (Griffin 1981a) to express themselves in alanguage-like way with gestures, and acquire the "vocabulary" of a
young human child.
Also, dolphins have been shown to be able to communicate certain
instructions to a mate purely by sound, while they could not see each
other (Fichtelius and Sjolander 1972).
Monkeys are known to have different warning calls for predators
in the air or on the ground (Seyfarth 1982). The explicit use of variation
in sound for communication, with which apparently detailed and precise information can be passed on, comes very close to what we call
''language.''

SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
Rather than attributing self-awareness only to language-using
species, many authors discuss the likelihood, and the need, for selfawareness in all socially organized species. Social animals, dependent
on each other for survival, must understand the other animals and
their mental state in order to act adequately (Humphrey 1978); or
must be able to recognize other individuals in relation to themselves in
order to maintain a hierarchy, as in the case of domestic pigs, cattle
and chickens (Bryant 1972), or to live in families or clans (Thorpe
1966). Fox (1974) describes altruistic behaviour in wolf clans: wolves
that go hunting bring back food for the cubs and the "babysitters"
that remained behind.
In the growing up of young animals, play and imitation are of
great importance. The great ability of young (and older) animals to
play indicates their need for the capacity to be aware of self and others,
the need to be able to react to new situations and make decisions; play
facilitates the development of these capacities. But apart from the
functional meaning of play, it implies that animals are spontaneous,
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creative and sentient beings, individuals who are fully able to enjoy
themselves.
While it is sometimes suggested that it is a proof of an animal's
"dumbness" that it imitates a researcher, instead of "consciously"
performing acts, authors like Thorpe, Midgley and Fox refer to play
and imitation as crucial for healthy development in the more complex
social animals, and as a clear indication of the animal's ability to
engage in creative, highly communicative action. The "teaching" of
the art of survival by parents to their offspring could even be seen as a
beginning of culture (Fox 1976). Bonner (1980) devotes a whole book to
"culture" in animal species.
Roughly speaking, the presence of "animal awareness" in' its
many forms has been discussed by going into the phenomena of learning behaviour, general intelligent behaviour, communicative behaviour and social behaviour.
Now that the question "can animals think?" has been discussed,
an equal amount could be written on the question "can animals feel?"
However, I will not attempt it, since many of the same principles that
apply to awareness, apply to the existence of emotions, and the two are
intimately, perhaps inseparably, linked together in animal behaviour.

ANIMAL FEELINGS
As a fact of life, feelings must be rudimentarily present in all life
forms, as Whitehead philosophically indicated. Basic emotions like
fear, aggression, frustration, and satisfaction are directly related to internal motivational states (Wiepkema 1982) and are essential for the
survival of the animal (Dawkins 1977; Murphy 1978; van Putten 1981).
For instance, fear in the predator-prey relationship is very essential.
Considerable research on fear in the domestic chicken has been done by
researchers like Hughes and Murphy (Murphy 1978).* The fact that
these "instincts" have a biological function, and in that respect might
be predictable, does not in the least imply the absence of an actual
emotional experience (Clark 1981; Dawkins 1977; van Rooyen 1981).
As the selfhood of animals develops into greater degrees of selfawareness it will be accompanied by a greater capacity for individual,
conscious emotion. This is especially evident in social animals, who
often form life-long bonds with mates or clans (Fox 1976). Well-known examples are swans, geese arid ducks who choose a partner for the rest of
their lives. Lorenz (1980) describes the signs of grief shown by a goose·
*See also Fear in Animals and Man, 1979. W. Sluckin (ed). New York: Van Nostrand
Reinhold,- Ed.
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when it looses its mate; for instance its eyes become dull, its muscles
weaken and the goose lets its head hang down, just as people do, so
Lorenz comments. He states that higher mammals and birds have
emotional experiences completely similar to ours, representative of the
basic structure of all experiences for man and animal alike (Lorenz
1980; see also Midgley 1978). Self-awareness of the emotional state is
shown by the chimpanzee Lucy, who possessed learned gesture-language;
during a session, when her foster mother went away, she ran to a window and signed to herself: "cry me, me cry" (Midgley 1978). She was
also able to appreciate jokes, and imitate them for her own amusement.
Emotions can also lead to empathetic (altruistic) action, such as
cases where dogs save little children, and dolphins support a sick or injured companion. Emotions must also underly the "psychic" tracking
of dogs who travel hundreds of miles to find their owners who moved
to a place, unknown(!) before the dog's arrival (Fox 1976). Because of
the similarity in emotional make-up, animals have many of the same
psychological illnesses and abnormalities as humans, e.g. anorexia and
depression, which in higher animals can occur as a result of sudden environmental changes, such as captivity and isolation from peers, mate
or parent (Fox 1971). Carter (1982), for example, presents evidence
which indicates strongly that many causes of death for dolphins in
captivity are psycho-physiological, the shock of captivity being the
cause for a loss of resistance to disease. Sometimes psychoneurotic illness can be the result of captivity or loss of a mate. This is also the
basis for the very extensive research that is being done on animals in
laboratories, using them as models for human disorders. Research to
find new drugs to relieve anxiety is often done on mice and rats (Goodman and Gilman 1975; McKegney 1982). The experiments of Suomi and
Harlow on the development of depression as a result of maternal deprivation are also well known. They developed "a monkey model of human anaclictic depression, since ... the resulting behaviours are seemingly identical for monkey and human infants alike" (Midgley 1981).
Because of this correspondence in structure and behaviour Midgley is
right, I think, when she criticizes such experiments from an ethical
point of view.
Midgley (1978) comments that "to be disposed to make the gestures, you must also be capable of the emotions in order for them to be
convincing and truly reciprocal;" "behaviour is only possible for a
creature with an inward dimension, with its own real perception of the
world." (Clark 1981). However, the mind is a private thing, as so many
scientists comment (Griffin 1981a), for humans and animals alike; and
so the gap remains, however much research and interpretation we are
prepared to do. At least humans can speak and explain their thoughts
and feelings. But animals cannot; or can they?

14

F. Wemelsfelder

Lorenz (1963, 1980) states that the similarity of experience, the
direct comparability of one's own experience with that of others is
beyond proof, in that it is so evident that we cannot not believe it. This
extends at least to higher vertebrates. Karl Buhler, according to
Lorenz, refers to this as "du-evidenz," a necessary axiom of life. It is
not up to science to establish the framework of communication and
recognition of behaviour, or have ''heady metaphysical doubt'' about
the similarity of experience of man and man, and man and animal,
since science itself depends on this mutual understanding (Clark 1981).
He goes on to say that "we do not see merely material motions (of an
animal) but rather the embodiment of character and feeling in a material mode.'' To make use of the so-called analogy-postulate to assume
animal awareness (Sambraus 1981) might not be direct enough. The
fact that we really do see the embodiment of character and feelings in
behaviour (Clark 1981; Midgley 1978; Fox 1983b) makes it not only
justified to describe "material entities in mentalistic terms" (Clark
1981) but we have no right to withhold those terms to describe animal
behaviour (Rollin 1982, personal communication). "Stones cannot be
bored, or cross, or joyful, but dogs and pigs and cattle can" (Clark
1981).
In an overall perspective, we might say that animals are alive, and
present in their beingness, for anyone who wants to see and meet them
on their own ground. What their minds, or inner experiences are like, is
largely expressed in their behaviour in intimate interaction with the
environment, including other individuals. Olfactory and auditory
senses might play as great a role in this interaction as the highly
valued visual senses (Fox 1976). Although it seems to bother many
scientists that many of the abilities ascribed to animals are also attributable to machines, the nature of the machine is given to it by man,
and the parts are equally as independent or durable as the whole; when
an animal dies, however, the whole body dies, which again shows the
causality of the whole, and the fundamental selfhood of a whole organism (Rollin 1981).
We, as human beings, share different traits with different species
(Midgley 1978) and are especially close to the more complex social
animals such as dogs, elephants, dolphins, and apes, in that those seem
to have a highly developed self-awareness and even self-reflectiveness. Besides, we are able to communicate with them, to a great extent, as one individual to another.
Human beings belong to the "Umwelt" of an animal, just as animals belong to ours. It is in the meeting of individual and Umwelt, of
man and animal, that mutual understanding and appreciation grows
(Kortlandt 1954). There is no separation between our position as
observer and as partner in the relationship and in this context it can be
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seen how our understanding of animals has a direct moral impact on
our actions.
The fact that it is justifiable to describe animal behaviour in empathetic terms does not imply at all that "scientific" inquiry in the
form of systematic observation would not be necessary and useful. It
is important in order to discover the nature of different animal species,
and systematically investigate different assumptions about their nature, needs, and interests.
The most instructive and direct way to learn about animals is by
observing their spontaneous behaviour under conditions where they
have total freedom to express themselves to their fullest potential
(Midgley 1978; Markowitz 1982). "Despite the difficulties, field work
with gorillas, chimpanzees, orangutans, and wolves demonstrates that
the most realistic observations and assessments on wild animals are
those made in the natural environment" (Carter 1982). For other
animals, for example dogs and cats, a·man-made environment can provide an adequate situation in which a personal bond between observer
and animal might well be a very valuable way of testing and understanding an animal (Mugford 1981; Fox 1983b).
Working in the experimental environment of a laboratory the danger is great that the knowledge which is produced "is hardly a wholesome source of learning, since it is based on abnormally conditioned
animals" (Carter 1982). The most important thing is to ask the right
question, so that the animal can show us its abilities. A negative
answer to a test, like Gallup's mirror-tests, might be our fault: we did
not ask the correct question for that particular species (Rees, Wolfle
1982, personal communication).
The capacities of an animal to feel and be aware are not static
states by themselves, but abilities that are constantly expressed and
developed in interaction among animal, man and environment.

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE FIELD OF
ANIMAL WELFARE
A being who is aware of his environment, and can react emotionally to external situations, is also able to suffer. Every level of "beingness'' has its own purpose and needs, and its own qualitative link with
its environment; the thwarting of those needs matters to an animal,
and most animals will struggle to survive if in danger. The whole notion of the nature, or telos, of an animal implies that it will suffer if a
certain level of "fulfillment" of its behavioural possibilities is not
reached. In relation to animals in present intensive production systems, Humphrey (1981) points out the importance of realizing that domestic animals have become "dull" and unresponsive not because they
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are dumb and stupid but because we have made them that way by depriving them of stimuli which would enable them to develop a proper
sense of selfhood.
The suggestion that domestic animals do not miss what they do
not know is rejected because the concept of animal awareness implies
that animals actually experience suffering in some conscious way. The
absence of human-like self-consciousness might even increase the intensity of animal suffering: most animals cannot foresee whether their
situation will improve or not, nor realize other factors which make
their suffering relative. Because of this lack of knowledge, all that may
exist for them is a feeling of suffering.
An animal, whether a "lower" or a "higher" one, is a qualitative,
sentient being. To affect its environment is to affect the quality of its
existence, and its individual well-being.
Current intensive production systems have affected what used to
be the natural environment of farm animals tremendously. The demand for efficiency and production more and more became the guiding
factor in designing and creating living environments for the animals.
As a result, environmental diversity has been reduced to its absolute
minimum. The reaction of animals, dependent on the environment as
they are for their development and health, to this deprivation, will be
detailed later in Section IV of this book (Animal Management, Wemelsfelder).
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